A preliminary investigation into an incident involving the offshore wind installation vessel Brave Tern says questions about the accident ‘remain unanswered,’ but suggests that windage may have affected the vessel’s ability to manoeuvre
The incident took place on 10 June 2026, when wind turbine components on Fred Olsen Windcarrier’s vessel struck another vessel, Wind Keeper, and the quayside at the Port of Esbjerg.
The vessel was loaded with wind turbine components for installation on RWE’s Thor offshore windfarm. Video widely available on social media appears to show turbine blades on Brave Tern being damaged as they struck a quayside crane.
An inspection report published survey by the Danish Maritime Authority after an extraordinary survey concluded, “At this moment, it is still not completely clear what happened. All equipment was working at departure and no alarms appeared before the collision.”
However, the report highlights the fact that the wind at departure was 9 m/s from the southwest and continued to increase as the vessel departed from the quayside. The authors of the report suggest that “the windage effect of the tower sections may have had a greater influence on the vessel’s manoeuvring performance than originally expected.”
The vessel was carrying tower sections stowed vertically on deck, each with a length of 120 m. In the aft part of the vessel, blades were secured in blade racks, with their tips protruding approximately 60 m beyond the starboard side. On starboard side, Brave Tern’s hull was damaged over an area of approximately 12 m2, from frame 153 to frame 161.
The report says the ship’s master had been with the vessel since it was delivered as a newbuilding, and had been master for six years. Rest hours registration was checked in the days up to the incident, and no violations were observed. Procedures for departure were followed and voyage plan was prepared for departure from the ship’s berth in Esbjerg to the Thor offshore windfarm, where the components were due to be installed.
The master of the vessel told the inspectors, “On departure, the vessel jacked down, and all systems appeared to be functioning properly. The vessel started with a heading of 112 degrees, then made turned 170 degrees, and looked normal. We proceeded to sail on a heading of 285 degrees at a speed of 3 to 4 knots. At this point, we switched to hand steering using the mini wheel and the third officer began steering under the pilot’s command. The pilot gave the command to steer 290 degrees.
“Once underway under the pilot’s guidance, I took a moment to assess the situation. From the steering console, everything appeared under control, with the vessel responding to the pilot’s commands as expected. I then walked to the starboard bridge wing to check the clearance between the blades and Wind Keeper. The distance seemed close, but my assessment at the time was that we would pass clear of Wind Keeper.
“As I returned toward the steering console, I heard a call that the blades were getting dangerously close, followed by a report that the blades had struck Wind Keeper’s starboard crane. Steering became difficult immediately after. The pilot continued issuing commands to the helmsman, who reported struggling to maintain control. It was then reported that the remaining blades and blade rack were at risk of hitting the shore cranes. At this point, I took control of the steering myself, trying to control the vessel’s movement. Despite my efforts, the starboard bow made contact with the quay side.
“I called the second mate over and instructed them to switch the vessel to DP mode to regain control. We managed to stabilize the vessel using DP mode. Simultaneously, I asked the chief officer to ring the general alarm and muster all personnel onboard, while the pilot was requested to call for tug assistance. We continued toward the turning basin outside Sodhaven using the DP joystick. I received confirmation that everyone was accounted for and unharmed.
“Once in the turning basin, just outside Sodhaven, we turned the vessel around and headed back toward the loadout quay, escorted by tugs. The chief engineer and chief officer began investigating the damage and found it was limited to the forward starboard side. It appeared only the outer shell was damaged. Based on our assessment, we decided to jack up at quay 720. The head harbour pilot came onboard to assist. Tugs remained alongside until the vessel was secured at quay 720.”
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