Crude tanker spot earnings stayed firm into mid-December but new sanctions risks emerge for owners
Clarksons data showed crude tanker spot earnings remained elevated in early December, with the largest sizes still carrying the market’s momentum to the week ending 12 December 2025.
VLCCs averaged US$118,721 per day (weighted average), down 1% week-on-week, with Middle East Gulf to China assessed at US$123,825 per day and steady, while Middle East Gulf to UK Continent earnings softened to US$97,351 per day (down 4%).
US Gulf exports remained supportive in absolute terms, but the weekly direction was mixed: US Gulf–UK Continent slipped to US$114,685 per day (down 5%), while US Gulf–China stayed broadly steady at US$90,756 per day (down 1%).
The implication is that owners retained leverage on the core longhaul crude lanes, but marginal rate resistance started to appear on some Atlantic moves.
In the mid-size crude segments, Clarksons’ assessments suggested a more uneven pattern across regions with Suezmax tanker average earnings assessed at down 4% week-on-week.
Aframax tanker earnings diverged by basin: the North Sea/UK Continent leg softened 6%, but Mediterranean and Black Sea assessments firmed, with Black Sea–Mediterranean up 11% and Med–Med up 22%.
Overall Aframax tanker average earnings were reported up 3% week-on-week, indicating incremental tightening in regional markets offset softness elsewhere.
"The outcome depended on how quickly Russia replaced services and ships"
On fleet supply, Clarksons’ world fleet and orderbook data pointed to a controlled but rising supply trajectory.
The tanker fleet above 10,000 dwt stood at 709M dwt as of 1 December 2025, with the active fleet at 688M dwt with growth estimated at 2% year-to-date, compared with about 1% in 2024.
Average speeds were indicated to have run 0.4% lower in 2025 versus 2024, a modest offset to headline capacity growth.
The orderbook remained meaningful across the main crude sizes: VLCCs had 47M dwt on order (17% of the fleet), Suezmaxes tankers 22M dwt (20%), and Aframaxes tankers 22M dwt (17%), with deliveries heavily back-ended into 2027 and beyond.
Demand-side indicators showed moderate growth in crude volumes but weaker conditions in oil products, with implications for tonne-miles rather than just barrels.
Clarksons’ oil production outlook for 2025 indicated world output of 106M b/d, up 2% compared with 2024, while total seaborne crude exports rose 1% to around 40M b/d.
In trade flows, China’s crude oil imports increased 3% to 10M b/d, while Europe’s crude imports declined 2% to 9M b/d.
The trade outlook was once again subject to external variables, with the focus on G7 discussions on removing the oil price cap, which signalled a potential shift from a managed compliance regime to an outright prohibition on G7 and EU maritime services supporting Russian oil shipments.
This was a change shipbroker Gibson said would have pushed Russian business “entirely to the shadow fleet”.
The broker argued in a recent paper Scrap the cap that the market impact is not linear: mainstream owners exiting Russian liftings could release tonnage back into conventional trades, but the outcome depends on how quickly Russia replaces services and ships, and how buyers respond.
Gibson noted UK and EU officials support the idea and that, even without US participation, restrictions anchored in London’s insurance and European lifting patterns would be difficult for mainstream operators to circumvent.
It also pointed to the September lowering of the UK and EU price cap to US$47.60/bbl, versus the headline G7 US$60.00/bbl, as an illustration of how de facto constraints could tighten through European enforcement.
Timing remained a swing factor, with measures discussed as part of an EU sanctions package due early 2026 and uncertainty over any wind-down period.
Vortexa analysis approached the same question as a logistics problem: it estimated Russia’s near-term crude trading fleet faces a tonnage pool shortfall of about 7M dwt, equivalent to 53 Suezmaxes and Aframaxes, against loading requirements observed in August–October.
While Russia could have sought older ships in the secondhand market for shadow-fleet absorption or redirected unsanctioned tonnage lifting Russian dirty petroleum products, Vortexa said an 11% shortfall could still have remained in one scenario.
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