Tugowners pursue state aid reform to restore military mobility compensation

A year on the Ports Strategy

The EU Ports Strategy, adopted on 4 March 2026, took the larger share of the ETA’s advocacy capacity over the year that preceded it. The choice not to file a separate response to the call for evidence on the military mobility package was a deliberate one. Both calls were open at the same time. The ETA put its weight behind the Ports Strategy and the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, believing that those files would set the operating environment for the sector for longer.

The pitch the ETA carried into the Ports Strategy work rested on four points. The first was for simpler, more streamlined regulation, with a level playing field both within the EU and against non-EU ports. The second was for differentiated treatment of ports inside and outside the TEN-T network, against a one-size-fits-all approach. The third, and the message that mattered most to the sector, was for recognition of towage’s role in port safety and security. The fourth was for ports to be treated as whole ecosystems, with strategic assets within them that needed protection.

“The strategy as adopted recognises towage as an important actor”

The framing the association used was wider than military mobility alone. “Security is not just the military,” Ms Darmanin said. “Security is fires which could happen, oil spills which could happen, because disruption is not necessarily war as we know it. We have seen in these last few years that disruption is really stopping safe operations or actually causing environmental consequences.”

The strategy as adopted recognises towage as an important actor. Ms Darmanin is realistic about how far that language goes. “Whether we got it is another matter,” she said. “But the strategy at least comes up with a recognition that towage is an important actor.”

The industrial dimension

The EU Industrial Maritime Strategy was adopted on the same day as the Ports Strategy. The ETA took part in a high-level discussion with Commissioners Tzitzikostas and Séjourné. The pitch broadened the strategic asset framing beyond towage to take in military vessels, dredgers, ice breakers and pilotage vessels. The main point was the need for a stronger European supply chain for production, repair and parts.

Ms Darmanin gave the kind of example that will be familiar to any operator. “You have a tug which is out of action for three or four months because the part is not available.” The strategy as adopted recognises the need for a stronger supply chain for parts and repair work, and for European capacity to retrofit existing fleets for green conversion alongside leadership in new green vessels.

The funding line

On the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the ETA’s work has run through coalition advocacy. The association joined a push earlier this year by around 35 transport-sector organisations calling for a €100Bn (US$114Bn) envelope for the Connecting Europe Facility, well above the €17.65Bn (US$20Bn) currently proposed for military mobility on its own. The argument tied the figure to the dual-use nature of port infrastructure.

The ETA’s specific aim in the CEF trilogues is twofold. The first is to make sure operational readiness investment is read to cover not just hard infrastructure but port capacity management, port services and superstructure. The second is the principle, now widely shared across the transport sector, that there is no regulatory obligation without funding pathways. If Member States are to take on new obligations under COM(2025) 847 and the Ports Strategy, the CEF has to fund the activities those obligations cover.

The mechanics of influence

Brussels lobbying runs through a network of Permanent Representations and attachés. Ms Darmanin was clear about where the work pays off. “You need to convince the advisor, not the parliamentarian.” The value of an association at this level lies in the strength of its network: which permanent representations have access to which files, and how industry positions can be matched to the interests of individual Member States.

On the labour dimension, the ETA has not formally engaged with the European Transport Workers’ Federation on the military mobility file. It has produced joint submissions with FEPORT and with maritime pilots’ representatives on the wider port files.

The local crew

One piece of evidence the Secretary General offered sits at an angle to a story often told about the European maritime sector. ETA member surveys show that 98 per cent of crew on European harbour tugs are local. Not nationally local: regionally local. They work in the port closest to home. The flag pattern follows: Spanish, French, Maltese, Greek and Italian operators often work with their local flags. The northern European pattern is less uniform, but the broader picture is of a sector largely insulated from the flags-of-convenience exposure that affects ocean shipping.

For the regulatory debate now in train, the 98 per cent finding has a direct bearing. The crewing question, framed by some stakeholders in terms of third-country nationals and flags of convenience, applies less directly to harbour towage than to many other parts of the industry. Sector positions on Article 38 transposition will be stronger for making that distinction plain.

The insurance gap

One file the ETA has not yet opened is engagement with the marine insurance market. The standard International Group P&I war risks excess cover for the 2026 policy year, set out in UK P&I Club Circular 02/26, terminates automatically if a vessel is requisitioned for title or for use. The policy also excludes losses arising from the requisition itself. The clause is materially the same across the major International Group clubs.

The practical effect matters. At the moment Article 38 temporary control is invoked, or military priority is granted under EMERS, the commercial war risks cover comes to an end. No EU-level mechanism currently steps in to replace it. Whatever Member States may pay under a reformed state aid framework, the underwriting arrangements sit separately. Ms Darmanin confirmed this engagement is on the agenda. The likely counterparts are the International Group of P&I Clubs and ECSA, the European Community Shipowners’ Associations. The work has not started. The intent to start it has been signalled.

Concessions and the moment of openness

For members in concession-based systems, common in Italy, Spain, Greece and Croatia, the military mobility rules raise a specific contractual question. The Italian framework is the most clearly drawn: Port System Authorities grant concessions to single operators on a port-by-port basis, with binding public service obligations on availability, fleet standards, crewing and tariffs.

The ETA’s institutional line on concessions is shaped by the make-up of its membership, which includes operators in both concession-based southern Europe and free-market northern Europe. Practical guidance to concession holders is well defined. The public service character of a concession carries with it an implied duty to be available in emergencies, and that includes military mobility. “This is the price of being in a concession,” Ms Darmanin said. But concession holders should not absorb that duty without securing protection.

“Disruption is not necessarily war as we know it”

The opening is contractual. Italian concessions, for example, are subject to periodic renegotiation, often before the term ends, when the port authority needs new tugs or vessels of a particular kind. “When there is a negotiation happening, this should be on the table,” recommended Ms Darmanin. Italian members should make sure the next renegotiation of their concession sets out the terms on which compensation for military mobility use will be paid. The moment of contractual openness is the moment to embed in the contract the protection that EU law does not provide. The same logic applies in any Member State where concession-based frameworks operate.

Looking ahead

Asked what she most wanted the sector to take from the past 18 months of work, Ms Darmanin set out three points.

The first was that the strength of the ETA’s advocacy depends on coalitions. The association cannot achieve significant policy change on its own and does not try to. The joint submissions with FEPORT and with maritime pilots, and the wider transport-sector groupings that have shaped the CEF and MFF debates, are the structure within which the work gets done.

The second was that the work is sustained over time. The Ports Strategy is the product of more than a year of engagement. The military mobility package has been on the agenda since the European Ports Forum took it up in early 2025. The CEF coalition work goes back further. Continuous presence in the venues where the texts are written is the price of influence.

“This is the price of being in a concession”

The third was a request to the membership. The ETA needs better intelligence from its members on how Member States are transposing the obligations arising from COM(2025) 847 and the Ports Strategy. The association, in Ms Darmanin’s own description, is a two-person organisation. It does not work at Member State level unless members ask it to. The natural source of intelligence on national transposition is the membership itself. The trilogues will produce instruments. The transpositions will produce the operational reality. The sector needs to know, in real time, what is happening at national level.

The compensation work will move through the state aid block exemption. The protection work has its first language in the Ports Strategy. The funding work runs through the CEF trilogues. The insurance work is the next file to open. None of it is settled. All of it is being contested in venues where a clear, coherent sector position is the difference between shaping the language and being shaped by it.