US port fees expose tanker fleet inefficiencies

The global tanker fleet is already fragmented by flag, ownership and sanctions exposure. A new policy measure by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) risks further dividing the fleet by origin and operator, with consequences for market efficiency and freight dynamics.

Under the Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime dominance, USTR has determined fees will be imposed on Chinese-built or Chinese-operated vessels entering US ports. The measure, set out in the Federal Register notice dated 17 April 2025, targets what the US deems to be "unreasonable" policies by China to dominate shipbuilding and logistics markets, actions that are said to burden or restrict US commerce.

In effect, the new rule means vessels operated by Chinese companies or constructed in Chinese shipyards will face phased-in port fees, beginning in October 2025.

These fees, structured per net tonne or container, will incrementally rise over three years. According to the notice, “the fee will be set at US$0 for the first 180 days, will then be set at US$50 NT, and will increase incrementally over the next three years”.

Several exemptions have been carved out, including for vessels arriving in ballast, those engaged in shortsea shipping of less than 2,000 nautical miles, and some US-owned vessels.

Notably, any operator who orders and takes delivery of a US-built vessel of equivalent capacity may receive a remission of the fee for up to three years.

The policy has drawn concern from shipping analysts, and speaking during a Vortexa market briefing, Vortexa freight analyst Mary Melton said the immediate impact would be to “make the global tanker fleet more segmented and more inefficient.”

She added only around 10% of the Aframax, Suezmax and VLCC fleet would be directly subject to the new charges, but the effects could be broader. “There is less optionality here, less flexibility,” she said. “Most likely, Chinese-built vessels will no longer be able to command the same charter premiums, because they will lack access to US trades.”

While the phased implementation gives owners time to reposition affected vessels, the policy introduces additional complexity to route planning and time charter negotiations.

Some shipowners may choose to redirect vessels away from US trades altogether, particularly those with repeated exposure such as the Latin America–Pad 5 route.

For ethane and other gas carriers, the implications are more acute, with Vortexa energy analyst Samantha Hartke noting 27% of global ethane trade is exposed to Chinese-built and operated vessels.

Ten such ships, all owned by a single Chinese petrochemical company, would each incur US$3M per voyage into the US, effectively pricing them out of the market.

While the current tanker impact is limited, broader restrictions could follow. The policy document also outlines potential future actions, including a requirement that a growing percentage of US LNG exports be transported on US-built vessels.

This would impose new structural constraints on tanker deployment, particularly if US shipbuilding capacity remains limited.

The fee structure, though milder than initially feared, nonetheless reflects a trend toward politicisation of maritime access.

As Ms Melton observed, “This is not just a tariffs story – it is a fleet segmentation story.”