Hormuz warning ripples across global shipping chokepoints

The financial mechanism of closure was almost as important as the attacks themselves. Reuters reported that maritime insurers cancelled war-risk cover early in the crisis and that Washington later assembled a reinsurance facility worth about US$20Bn to restore confidence. Even then, there was no quick return to normal traffic. US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent said the insurance plan and potential escorts should “quickly fix shipping in the region”, but the same Reuters reporting made clear that escort operations themselves would be risky and that the Navy’s capacity to provide them remained uncertain. Hormuz therefore demonstrated that state-backed insurance can soften the shock, but it cannot, on its own, reopen a contested sea lane.

This is where the case becomes larger than the Gulf. Research published in Nature and highlighted by Oxford Martin estimated the expected value of trade disrupted at maritime chokepoints at US$192Bn a year, with geopolitical risk at the Taiwan Strait and Suez Canal carrying much of the exposure, and Bab el-Mandeb combining conflict and other hazards. The study argued that global trade relies on a small number of vulnerable passageways and that countries remain poorly prepared for interruptions. Hormuz has now supplied a live demonstration of how such interruption can happen without a classic blockade.

"Hormuz showed that ships can be deterred without being physically stopped"

Taiwan is the clearest reverse scenario. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington, DC-based foreign policy and security think tank, war-gamed Taiwan blockade contingencies and concluded that “after China boards and seizes several ships, commercial traffic to Taiwan ceases.” That finding sits uncomfortably beside the Hormuz experience. Washington moved fast in the Gulf, struck mine-laying vessels and built an insurance response, yet it still could not guarantee escorted transit at scale. If that was the limit in a theatre where the US already had deep military presence, the question for Taiwan is not simply whether the US would intervene, but whether it could keep ordinary merchant shipping moving before commercial actors pulled back on their own judgement.

The same logic reaches Panama, though in a different way. Panama is not primarily a naval confrontation zone. It is a concentrated commercial system whose value rises when other routes come under pressure. Reuters reported this month that the Panama Canal remained the world’s second-busiest interoceanic waterway, while Associated Press said the administrator saw scope for higher traffic if rising fuel costs and disruption in the Gulf redirected trade. The canal could cut travel time by three to 15 days, depending on the route. That makes it economically attractive – and strategically tempting. A hostile actor would not need to destroy the canal to damage it. Hybrid attacks on approaches, locks, support infrastructure or traffic management could be enough to trigger suspension, delay and retreat of insurance underwriting.

The non-state dimension should be handled carefully, but it should not be ignored. Reuters has reported that the Trump administration expanded military surveillance against Mexican cartels and later described direct US strikes on suspected drug-smuggling boats near Venezuela. That creates a setting in which well-funded criminal organisations may have greater reason to think in retaliatory, rather than purely commercial terms. There is no sourced evidence that cartels are planning to attack the Panama Canal, and that absence matters. But Hormuz suggests that the threshold for disruption is lower than many in shipping had assumed. A campaign designed to create fear, confusion and insurance stress no longer requires the resources of a state navy.

A Cuba contingency belongs in the same conversation for different reasons. On 16 March 2026, President Trump said talks with Cuba were ongoing and hinted that action was possible after Iran, while Associated Press said Senate Democrats had filed a war powers resolution after Trump’s talk of a possible “takeover” of Cuba. Reuters also reported that Cuba remained in a severe economic crisis, driven by oil shortages and blackouts. A confrontation around Cuba would not rank with Hormuz in scale, but it would place fresh risk into the Florida Straits, Yucatán Channel and wider Caribbean routes that connect the US Gulf, Atlantic trades and Panama-linked traffic.

Panama Canal traffic could be disrupted by hybrid threats stopping short of a blockade (source: APC)

For tanker and LNG operators, the practical lesson is blunt. Resilience can no longer be reduced to naval presence and Best Management Practice. Hormuz showed that ships can be deterred without being physically stopped, that stationary operations can be more exposed than transits, and that the commercial system – insurance, charterparty risk allocation, crew willingness and port access – can fail before the military balance is settled. Operators therefore need contingency planning that assumes rerouting, delayed discharge, alternative loading points, heavier use of storage and STS, navigation in degraded electronic conditions (spoofing, GPS interfence), and early negotiation with insurers and charterers before a crisis begins. JMIC’s warning about stationary vessels and electronic interference should be read well beyond the Gulf.

The wider conclusion is that the next chokepoint crisis may not look like a blockade at all. It may begin with drones, jamming, ambiguous attacks, insurer / underwriter hesitation and official promises that cannot be turned into immediate commercial protection. Hormuz has shown how quickly that mix can close a passage in practical terms. The world’s other chokepoints – from Taiwan to Panama, from Bab el-Mandeb to the Caribbean approaches – should now be judged against that harder standard.

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