Escorts are not up in arms off Nigeria

The current practice of using Nigerian Navy (and Nigerian security forces in general) is coming under review by the Buhari presidency.  

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governs the conditions under which private security companies may access Nigerian Navy personnel, reports consultants Risk Intelligence in a briefing document. Articles 5 and 6 of the MoU stipulate that any vessels upon which Nigerian Navy personnel are embarked must be “approved and inspected” by the Nigerian Navy, capable of taking a mounted weapon, and be entered in the Nigerian fleet list. Only then is it allowed to contract navy personnel to man these vessels. It appears likely that the legal review undertaken by the current presidency will focus on compliance with the MoU.

The vast majority of MoU holders in Nigeria violate these stipulations by embarking Navy personnel directly on client ships, says Risk Intelligence. There has been misleading guidance to the effect that the following is adequate in order to provide armed security in Nigerian waters: a Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps license (for guard companies); an MoU in the name of the PMSC; a NIMASA license to operate as a Guard Force Security company in the Maritime Sector; a Certificate of incorporation in Nigeria; and evidence of an expatriate quota.

While this documentation is necessary to operate as a maritime security company, it does not in itself provide authorisation for embarking Nigerian Navy personnel on merchant vessels. Furthermore, the NSCDC license is reserved for unarmed guard services, hence all authorisation to operate hinges on compliance with the MoU. It is incorrect to use the term “legal,” since no legislation in Nigeria exists that regulates armed maritime security activity. Using authorisations other than that provided by the Navy Chief of Staff (through the MoU) and failure to comply with the stipulations of the MoU create the risk of detentions and fines for ship operators.

Lastly, it should be remembered that the embarkation of armed security in the configuration of three to four-man teams with light weapons provides little to no deterrence to those attackers that pose the greatest risk. Numerous firefights with casualties and boardings (including kidnappings) have demonstrated the increased risk of using embarked Nigerian security forces.