Venezuela: how US action will redraw the tanker trades

Following the 3 January 2026 intervention, it has been reported that several loaded vessels did not sail and others left empty, and Reuters reported that a total suspension “could accelerate the country’s need to cut back output at oilfields” because storage had been filled.

Reuters also reported that President Trump said the US “would run Venezuela ‘for a period of time’”, while also stating that he would maintain the US embargo “for now”, creating an ambiguous near-term frame for physical trade. For tanker owners, that ambiguity matters as much as the headline event. A hard stop creates idle time and disrupts positioning. A fast reopening under revised permissions could rapidly reroute barrels back towards the US Gulf Coast, with demand concentrated in Aframax tankers and potentially Suezmax tankers, depending on loading and discharge constraints. Breakwave’s observation that US-bound flows relied heavily on Aframax tankers supports that directional call on sector exposure.

Reuters noted that many US Gulf Coast refineries still require heavy grades to optimise operations. The EIA today-in-energy analysis added that Citgo operates three refineries with combined capacity of over 800,000 b/d designed to process heavy oil, and it described ongoing creditor-driven processes affecting those assets. This matters because Venezuelan crude is not just another incremental barrel; it fits a specific crude slate problem in a region that has spent years substituting with other heavy sources. CRS had already framed this dynamic in earlier sanctions discussions, describing the balancing problem between desired political effects and impacts on “US consumers” and “US business interests,” while also emphasising the scale of crude trade in the bilateral relationship.

"At this point in time, a post-Maduro Venezuela leans toward three possible tanker activity scenarios"

Products shipping sits alongside crude, although the volumes and routes are less visible in the January 2026 reporting. CRS, in a 2018 context, recorded two-way petroleum product flows: Venezuela exported 55,000 b/d of petroleum products to the US in 2017; while the US exported 77,000 b/d of petroleum products to Venezuela, with “approximately 50%” described as naphtha used as diluent.

EIA’s 2024 country brief added that, in 2018, PDVSA announced an “indefinite suspension” of crude oil and fuel exports to Petrocaribe countries except Cuba, citing insufficient production and domestic fuel shortages. Reuters reporting on PDVSA’s blending constraints also showed how imports and swaps interacted with export capability, including references to light crude imports and the role of heavy naphtha supply from partners such as Chevron.

Those product and diluent linkages matter for product tankers because they affect both the upstream ability to move exportable crude blends and the downstream need to move refinery products once crude is processed. The freight story is therefore not limited to crude. It extends into naphtha movements, refined product redistribution, and, in the US context, coastal constraints.

Which requires a look at how this may impact the Jones Act tanker trades. The US Maritime Administration describes the Jones Act as applying to “merchandise being transported by water between US points” and states that it requires cargo to be shipped on vessels that were “US-built, US-citizen owned” and “registered in the US”. The statutory basis is set out in 46 U.S.C. § 55102. In practical terms, Venezuelan crude imports into the US were not Jones Act cargo, but any change in refinery runs that altered coastwise product movements - for example, redistribution from the Gulf Coast to other US coastal markets – will bring the Act into play and benefit domestic tanker operators.

At this point in time, a post-Maduro Venezuela leans toward three possible tanker activity scenarios.

In the first scenario, Venezuelan ports reopen relatively quickly under a transition that enables a partial relaxation of restrictions, and barrels are redirected to the US as a natural short-haul outlet for heavy crude. Reuters described a “rapid rerouting” back towards the US as likely under a smooth transition. Under this case, tonne-mile demand from Venezuelan exports would tend to fall compared with a China-weighted pattern, because the average voyage length is shortened. The beneficiary would be regional crude tanker demand, consistent with Breakwave’s Aframax-heavy description for US-bound flows. The corollary would be weaker long-haul demand linked to Asia, including VLCC employment where that trade had persisted.

In the second scenario, export paralysis persists and Venezuela’s upstream and storage limits force material production shut-ins, reducing overall seaborne volumes rather than simply redirecting them. Reuters reported that a total suspension of exports “could accelerate the country’s need to cut back output” as storage filled. Under that case, the immediate outcome for tankers would not be rerouting but a disappearance of liftings, with knock-on effects for positioning and utilisation in the Atlantic Basin. The effects on rates would then depend on how other crude oil systems respond.

In a third scenario, restrictions are eased and investment returns unevenly, but production recovery lags because infrastructure rehabilitation and operational inputs such as diluent remain binding constraints. EIA stated that further increases in production “will take longer” and that potential growth remained “highly uncertain” because “significant new investment would be required”. Reuters carried a closely aligned warning from Rystad Energy’s head of geopolitical analysis about the speed of stabilisation after forced regime change, quoting: “History shows that forced regime change rarely stabilises oil supply quickly, with Libya and Iraq offering clear and sobering precedents.”

In this scenario, crude oil export volumes might recover only gradually, while destination mix could remain bifurcated between a US pull for heavy grades and an Asia-linked component driven by debt and commercial arrangements already embedded in the system. The continued visibility of VLCC-linked repayment flows in Reuters’ reporting illustrates why a clean break from Asia could not be assumed from geopolitics alone.

Across all three scenarios, the historical baseline matters because it defines the ceiling of what “normal” might mean in volume terms, and the associated tanker mix. The late-1990s and early-2000s period was the last clearly evidenced period where Venezuelan production and exports resembled a stable, high-volume system serving the US as a primary outlet.

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