MAIB urges tighter watchkeeping after tanker collision

MAIB reported that the master and second officer “did not discuss any action they could take”.

The collision occurred at 1503 when, according to the MAIB, Apache’s starboard anchor contacted Serinah’s bow and penetrated the hull above the waterline, after which the tanker’s forward movement over the trawl wires pulled the stern down and contributed to the sinking.

The report also described the master’s immediate reaction on the bridge wing as Serinah passed down the starboard side, writing that he shouted, “Are you crazy! Are you crazy! Are you crazy!” at the fishing vessel’s crew.

In post-collision events, MAIB reported that Apache did not stop immediately to render assistance, continuing towards the pilot boarding station until the crew were reminded by His Majesty’s Coastguard Belfast of their responsibility to assist.

MAIB recorded the master’s VHF exchanges with Clydeport Local Port Services, including the statement, “I proceed to the pilot station”, after reporting that a fishing boat had struck the tanker’s bow and that three people were getting into a liferaft.

The investigation linked the failure to help a lack of procedural familiarity and perceived time pressure, stating that the master’s radio calls to port state control and lifeboat control indicated “a lack of familiarity with the correct procedure.

MAIB added that the decision not to stop “placed Serinah’s three crew at serious risk” and was “in contravention of the responsibilities set out in UNCLOS and the Merchant Shipping Act 1995”.

Beyond the actions on the tanker, MAIB also highlighted competence gaps on the fishing vessel.

It reported that neither of Serinah’s deckhands had completed any formal navigational training and were “ill-equipped to understand the developing situation or the need for pre-emptive action to help avoid a collision”.

MAIB concluded that the mandatory training framework for fishermen “did not ensure that those undertaking a navigation watch were qualified to do so safely”.

The report also identified limitations in port monitoring, stating that Clydeport Local Port Services “could not monitor the traffic situation in the Firth of Clyde”.

MAIB contrasted local port services with vessel traffic services, noting that local port services did not require the ability or resources “to respond to developing traffic situations” and did not require “a vessel traffic image to be maintained”.

MAIB recorded a series of actions taken following the casualty.

Peel Ports Group Ltd developed a 5-year plan to upgrade to a VTS in the Clydeport area, and Nereus Shipping alerted its fleet, conducted additional audits, delivered inhouse watchkeeping training, reviewed voyage data recorder records across the fleet, and revised navigational procedures on closest point of approach limits in coastal waters.

MAIB issued three recommendations.

It recommended that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency require skippers and watchkeepers on UK commercial fishing vessels between 7.0 m and 16.5 m to complete approved navigational training (2026/112).

It recommended that Nereus Shipping “Engage with a fisheries liaison officer to increase its understanding of global fishing vessel behaviour and promulgate the information gained to its fleet” (2026/113).

It recommended that S & B Fish (Agency) Ltd ensure crew expected to hold a navigational watch are sufficiently experienced and have working knowledge of the collision regulations (2026/114).

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